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SYMPOSIUM 
THE NEW ORIGINALISM IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Editors’ Foreword 
 
On March 1 and 2, 2013, the Fordham Law Review hosted a Symposium 
entitled The New Originalism in Constitutional Law.  The two-day 
Symposium reflected on a host of theories that have developed since the 
advent of originalism in the late 1970s and 1980s, considering if, how, and 
why these theories—broadly referred to as New Originalism—should 
influence constitutional interpretation.  The Symposium presented five 
panels that examined these questions from a variety of angles. 
The first panel examined the evolution of originalism from its origins as 
a theory of constitutional interpretation to the way it influences other 
theories today.  Professor Keith Whittington discussed the origins of 
originalism as a reaction by conservative critics of the Warren Court’s 
decisions, and characterized the New Originalism as a response to 
criticisms of the old originalism, as well as a reconsideration of earlier 
originalist assumptions and conclusions.1  Professor Whittington also 
outlined points of harmony and disagreement between recent originalist 
theorists and originalist critics.2  Professor Randy Barnett discussed the 
gravitational force that New Originalism has on judges who accept the 
relevance of original meaning, even when the original meaning of the 
Constitution does not appear to be the basis of a judicial decision.3  
Professor James Fleming discussed the shift from old originalism to an 
inclusive New Originalism and acknowledged that reconciliation between 
New Originalism and the moral reading of the Constitution may be better 
than anticipated.4  Professor Fleming cautioned, however, that New 
Originalism’s shift in focus from Framers’ intent to original public meaning 
blunts reflection and choice in constitutional self-government.5 
The second and third panels analyzed the different ways that these 
theories define, identify, and use meaning in constitutional interpretation.  
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Professor Lawrence Solum focused his discussion on constitutional 
construction, advancing two primary claims:  “First, constitutional 
construction is ubiquitous in constitutional practice.”6  Second, the 
construction zone—where the constitutional text is underdeterminate or 
irreducibly ambiguous—is ineliminable.7  Professor Larry Alexander 
posited that anyone who must interpret the promulgations of legal 
authorities should seek the authorially intended meaning.8  Professor 
Mitchell Berman, joined in the authorship of his article by Professor Kevin 
Toh, examined what they describe as the “center of gravity” of New 
Originalism, identifying what judges are supposed to interpret, and what the 
answer to that question implies.9  Professor Andrei Marmor discussed the 
difference between originalist and nonoriginalist views between concepts 
and conceptions, arguing that the debate is mostly a moral-political one 
about the purpose a constitution serves and what makes it legitimate.10  
Professor Scott Soames presented “Deferentialism,” a close affiliate of 
originalism that first asks, “[W]hat does the law say, assert, or stipulate?”11  
Once meaning is identified, “intent becomes constitutive, as opposed to 
merely evidential.”12  Professor Tara Smith argued that originalism suffers 
from a fatal flaw of conflating objective meaning with original meaning, 
and that this flaw turns constitutional interpretation into a “he said, she 
said” battle that ultimately does not provide for objective rule of law.13   
The fourth panel discussed the role of history in constitutional 
interpretation.  Professor Jack Balkin used his own version of New 
Originalism that he called “framework originalism,” developed in Living 
Originalism,14 to recognize how originalists use and nonoriginalists should 
use arguments from tradition and cultural memory as intellectual tools “to 
understand the challenges of the present, and to argue with their fellow 
citizens about the proper direction of the constitutional project in the 
future.”15  Professor Saul Cornell highlighted how originalist practices are 
largely antithetical to accepted historical methodology and offered an 
analysis of how contemporary intellectual history provides a stronger 
historical base to help facilitate a more serious debate over the proper role 
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of history in constitutional analysis.16  Professor Andrew Kent evaluated 
how New Originalism interprets the foreign affairs provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution and suggested that the exacting textualism of New Originalism 
may leave a large gap between its results and the expectations and practices 
of the Founders, calling New Originalism’s usefulness into question.17 
The Symposium concluded with a panel discussing constitutional theory 
with and without originalism.  Professor Leslie Goldstein discussed the 
originalist position on precedent, taking issue with the originalist argument 
that U.S. Supreme Court justices should feel obliged to follow the original 
understanding of the Constitution, even when it contradicts longstanding 
precedent.18  In contrast to this position, Professor Goldstein argued “that 
the same rule of law and popular sovereignty concerns deployed to justify 
originalism are best interpreted as recommending some well-settled 
precedent be upheld.”19  Professor Bernadette Meyler posited that the 
constitutional construction theory that many New Originalists adopt as a 
supplement to interpretation accepts that, in the absence of a majority 
Founding-era view about meaning, there can be no original meaning.20  
Professor Meyler argued that this position undervalues and neglects the role 
of multiple meanings in constitutional analysis and in the democratic 
process itself.21 
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